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PRIVACY, AUTHENTICITY & EQUALITY:
THE MORAL AND LEGAL CASE FOR THE
RIGHT TO HOMOSEXUAL MARRIAGE
Jeffery L. Johnson
I.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalien-
able Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of
Happiness.'
There is neither a claim to self-evidence, nor the authority of
natural law, but that deeply and widely held political and moral val-
ues, as well as contemporary constitutional principles, demand that we
look more thoroughly at our commitment to equality, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. Such an examination makes it close to self-evi-
dent that homosexual couples should have the right to full legal
marriage.
It should be immediately obvious that this thesis is intended as
philosophical and jurisprudential and in no way empirical. Although
recent constitutional law is used generously, it is not a prediction
whatsoever about what legislatures and courts will be doing in the
near future. To the degree that they do tackle this issue, the odds are
that the results will be disappointing. Nevertheless, this argument is
sketched for its intrinsic interest, and because arguments of pure prin-
ciple have value even in the absence of political will and judicial
courage.
II.
No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected,
is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is com-
pletely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified. The
only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own
good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others
of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
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guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and
spiritual.
2
Mill is the starting point for any examination of political liberty.
He argues for its normative centrality on utilitarian grounds.3 In addi-
tion, he ties personal freedom to the absence of harm to others.
[Tithe sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized commu-
nity, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
4
It is doubtful that such a principle would always result in the strict
mathematical maximization of pleasure over pain. Despite many obvi-
ous moral and political deficiencies, a society that severely limited
certain freedoms might well be efficient, orderly, and secure. A strong
case might be made that on a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis, it was to
be preferred. Even more problematic, however, is the harm principle
itself. Pure self-regarding acts are so rare as to make Mill's protection
vacuous - seat belt laws protect all of us from higher insurance and
medical costs, etc.
Mill's central insight regarding "the nature and limits of the
power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individ-
ual"5 might be salvaged by abandoning his strict utilitarianism and the
attendant harm to others principle. Indeed the quote above suggests
an attractive alternative - "freedom . . . is that of pursuing our own
good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of
theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it."6 This is reminiscent of the
language, if not the spirit, of Rawls.
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of
liberty for all. 7
Now Rawls is clear that he is not concerned with the freedom to act,
but civil liberties as rights. But if a just system treated the liberty in
"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," or "life, liberty and prop-
erty,"8 as robust civil liberties like freedom of religion or the right to
2. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 16-7 (Currin V. Shields ed., Bobbs-Merril 1976)
(1859).
3. Id. at 14 ("I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions.").
4. Id. at 68.
5. Id. at 59.
6. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
7. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 53 (Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (1971).
8. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
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vote, Rawls and Mill come close to being on the same page. Arthur
Ripstein presents the most thorough defense of political liberty from a
perspective focused on equalizing personal freedom.
[A] person is free if she, rather than anyone else, is the one who gets
to decide how to use her powers. In so far as another person decides
for her, she is dependent on that person, and her sovereignty is
compromised. ... [T]he only legitimate restrictions on conduct are
those that secure the mutual independence of free persons from
each other.9
An unabashed political liberal might find such a standard virtu-
ally unexceptionable. It will not do, however, for the purposes in the
present context. The first problem concerns legal moralism. Jeffrie
Murphy makes a powerful case that liberals feel comfortable with a
certain amount of private morality encroaching into the law. 10 He fo-
cuses on the sentencing discretion of judges. Most liberals want judges
to make judgments about the moral virtues and vices of the defendants
they are sentencing. Consider hate crimes, or mitigating factors in a
vehicular homicide. More directly challenging to the equal freedom cri-
terion, however, are cases like corpse desecration. Thomas Grey
argued a generation ago that these actions were a clear counter-exam-
ple to Mill's harm to others principle." They are probably equally
troubling to the equal freedom principle.
Perhaps most devastating to this argument so far is the obvious
fact that not everyone is a political liberal. Communitarians, long
before liberals had the convenient moniker, have insisted that there
should be legitimate restrictions on individual behavior that have
nothing to do with the harm of others, or the equal freedom of individu-
als. Indeed, as if anticipating the gay marriage issue, Hart and Devlin
debated homosexual rights a half-century ago on precisely these liberal
and communitarian lines. 12 In an attempt to marshal consensus here,
there will be no further attempts to defend liberalism,1 3 but rather out-
line some additional political values that communitarians may share.
9. Arthur Ripstein, Beyond the Harm Principle, in 34 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC
AFFAIRS No. 3 pp. 216-46 reprinted in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW at 264, 271 (Joel Feinberg
& Jules Coleman eds., 8th ed. 2007) p. 264 and p. 271.
10. Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Legal Moralism and Liberalism," 37 ARiz. L. REV. pp. 73-88
(1995).
11. THOMAS C. GREY, The Legal Enforcement of Morality (Knopf, 1983).
12. See H.L.A HART, LAw, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (Oxford Univ. Press) (1963) and
PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (Oxford Univ. Press) (1965).
13. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 14 (Oxford Univ. Press) (1984). "[Tlhe word
"liberal" . . . should refer to one who has so powerful a commitment to liberty that he is
motivated to limit the number of acknowledged liberty-limiting principles as narrowly as
possible."
2008
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW
III.
[The] celebration of fidelity to oneself gives voice to a central theme
of modern consciousness: the search for authenticity. The idea that
there is an "intimate self' whose needs cannot be fulfilled by follow-
ing "borrowed truths" is a familiar modern notion and one that
contrasts sharply with traditional outlooks. 14
Consider the businesswoman who abandons a lucrative career
because she has always felt that her true calling was to be a public
school teacher, or the highly recruited, top of his class, Harvard law
student who accepts a position as a public defender not to hone his
litigation skills, but because he feels that the poor deserve good legal
representation as well. These cases are chosen to engender normative
attitudes of admiration, but cases focusing on disapprobation are just
as easy to construct. Think about the woman who remains in the love-
less marriage for the sake of a large inheritance, or a colleague who
moves from his true love, the classroom, into administration for the
money.
All of these hypothetical choices raise questions of liberty.
Judge them not merely on the matrix of free versus compelled, but
against some equally vague and abstract standard of being true to
yourself. Certain choices gain significance because they help define
who a person is, and who he or she shall become. Leslie Green in a
brilliant short article argues that choices and the legal absence of
choices about sexuality often fall into this special category of
authenticity.
15
The so-called sexual revolution is a creature of modernity, as is the
distinctive notion that there is an inner truth about sexuality. The
example is important, not merely because it considers an issue too
rarely discussed by mainstream philosophy, but because around
sexuality the notions of authenticity, being true to oneself, defining
one's life with or against traditional meanings, are all right at the
surface.
1 6
Being true to one's sexual self is tricky business. No one wants
pedophiles or serial adulterers to be comfortable with being true to
their authentic nature. But even in these cases it is easily seen how a
most basic part of who the person is comes into tragic conflict with the
larger social environment. Now pedophilia and serial adultery have
14. Leslie Green, Sexuality, Authenticity, and Modernity, 8 CANJLJuR. pp. 67-82
(1995), reprinted in FEINBERG, supra note 9, at 380-1.
15. Id. at 381.
16. Id. at 381.
Vol. 3:1:21
PRIVACY, AUTHENTICITY & EQUALITY
such serious and obvious negative consequences that no one, certainly
not the strict utilitarian, will have any qualms with society enacting
severe sanctions expressly designed to prevent personal authenticity in
this important psychologically, if not normatively, part of who the per-
son really is. The case is far less clear, however, with restrictions on
homosexual authenticity. It's not that the gay couples are denied
something they want. Nor are they faced with a severe restriction on
their personal liberty. It is that they are forced to deny something that
truly defines who they are for reasons that often seem arbitrary, preju-
dicial, and almost superstitious.
IV.
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signifi-
cance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions
of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to
be let alone the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. 17
Louis Brandeis in" many ways began the scholarly investigation
of personal and legal privacy. In 1890, his concern was print media
and its intrusion into the private lives of prominent Boston citizens,
including his partner and co-author, Samuel Warren.18 By 1928, as a
Justice on the Supreme Court, the right "to be left alone" had expanded
from not just the media, but from government, and its source from the
common law to the Fourth Amendment.' 9 For over a hundred years
now, philosophers, academic lawyers, and other scholars have sought
to make, in Brandeis' wonderful subtitle, "the implicit made explicit.
'20
This is a very difficult task, one guaranteed to engender controversy,
and that even the most promising models may be vulnerable to philo-
sophical and legal counter-example. However, the difficulty of the
analytical task in no way compromises the existence of the moral, po-
litical, and legal value. Precise philosophical models may never be
17. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), (Brandeis J., dissenting).
18. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy [The Implicit Made
Explicit], 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193-220 (1890), reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY, 75-103 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed.,Cambridge, UK Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984).
19. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478.
20. Supra at n. 18
2008
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW
found that improve on colloquial speech - "the right to be let alone," or
what is "nobody's business. "21
If there is such a thing as privacy; and what could be more obvi-
ous than that there is privacy? Privacy should be able to be described
in some quasi-precise way. For many years, privacy was a moral, so-
cial, and legal immunity from the judgment of others.22 The model
now needs to be expanded to include non-judgmental intrusions as
well. A working hypothesis is that privacy is defined as immunity from
the illegitimate focused attention of others, including but not limited
to, reporters, snoops, voyeurs, law enforcement officials, and legisla-
tors.23 Such a definition is candidly normative, since not all focused
attention is barred, but only that which is illegitimate. Here, of course,
lies the rub. What focused attention counts as illegitimate?
The precise parameters of privacy are culturally determined
and, consequently, differ across cultures and even within cultures as
those cultures change. None of the sociological factors, however, in any
way diminish the reality and importance of personal privacy. One con-
tinual theme in the scholarly literature is that privacy is closely
connected to the concept of intimacy. 24 Justice Brennan offered a clear
statement of this aspect of personal privacy in legislative and constitu-
tional spheres.
If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individ-
ual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion in to matters ... fundamentally affecting a person .... 25
Even those most suspicious of the constitutional existence of such a
right within the Due Process Clause should grant its existence within
the wider social and political culture.
Justice Brennan was specifically concerned with birth control,
and was foreshadowing abortion - "as the decision whether to bear or
21. See JAMES RACHELS, Why Privacy is Important, 9 PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 4,
223-33 (Princeton University Press 1975), reprinted in Schoeman, supra note 18.
22. See Jeffery L. Johnson, Constitutional Privacy, 13 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 161-93
(Springer Netherlands 1994). See also, Jeffery L. Johnson, Privacy and the Judgment of
Other, 23 JOURNAL OF VALUE INQUIRY 157-68, (Springer Netherlands 1989); and A Theory of
the Nature and Value of Privacy, 6 PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY 3, 271-88, (University of
Illinois 1992).
23. Jeffery L. Johnson, Immunity from the Illegitimate Focused Attention of Others: An
Explanation of Our Thinking and Talking About Privacy, ETHICS AND THE INTERNET 49-70
(Anton Vedder ed., Intersntia, 2001), and Immunity for the Focused Attention of Others: A
Conceptual and Normative Model of Personal and Legal Privacy, 2. FLA. AGRIC. & MECH. U.
L. REV. 131-83 (2007).
24. See, e.g., JULIE INNES, PRIVACY, INTIMACY AND ISOLATION, (Oxford Univ. Press,
1992).
25. Eisenstadt v.* Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
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beget a child."26 On the other hand, our Court has also clearly seen the
privacy implications of laws restricting the right to die,27 homosexual
sodomy,28 and sexuality in general.29 Most significantly for the argu-
ment prosecuted here, the Court clearly sees the significance of
marriage as an area where citizens are entitled to be left alone. In a
case involving forced sterilization, and assuming a very conventional
heterosexual form of marriage, Justice Douglas sees marriage as a fun-
damental right.
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race.
30
It's not that marriage is not exactly none of the government's business,
that marriage is, in part, a secular and social institution that govern-
ment needs to be involved with. Nevertheless, individual marriages,
as well as the institution of marriage itself, remain, intimate, special,
and deserving of as much "letting alone" as is possible.
31
V.
The Constitution does not require that things different in fact be
treated in the law as though they were the same. But it does re-
quire, in its concern for equality, that those who are similarly
situated be similarly treated. The measure of the reasonableness of
a classification is the degree of its success in treating similarly
those similarly situated. 32
Homosexual couples are clearly different than heterosexual
couples, even though this apparent biological fact contains deeply cul-
tural constructions. The question with gay marriage is whether they
are similarly situated. All couples seeking to marry are different in
significant ways - the age of the partners, their religions, their races,
politics, residence, and opinions on salad before or after the entrees.
26. Id.
27. Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990).
28. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003).
29. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
30. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
31. Jeffrey L. Johnson (Though not complete letting alone. As many feminist scholars
have pointed out, too much privacy in a marriage can provide a fertile medium for abuse
and exploitation).
32. Joseph Tussman and & Jacobus Tenebroek, "The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REV. 341, 341-81 (1949), pp. 341-81, . Reprinted in Frederick Schauer and Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong, editors, The Philosophy of Law (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1996),
547).
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The law, however, only treats them differently in certain very specific
cases, both partners being of legal age, or not being of the same sex. At
the very least, it would seem that opponents of homosexual marriage
have the burden of establishing that they are not similarly situated to
otherwise legal heterosexual couples.
Some have argued that the whole notion of equality is vacuous.
The argument is simple.
So there it is: equality is entirely "[c]ircular." It tells us to treat like
people alike; but when we ask who "like people" are, we are told
they are people who should be treated alike. Equality is an empty
vessel with no substantive moral content of its own.
3 3
The critic poses an impossible task. No one can analyze inherently
normative concepts such as "similarly situated," or "like people," in a
way that is normatively neutral. 34 Fortunately, the task in the cur-
rent context is not a philosophical analysis of equality. A right,
whether moral, social, political, or legal, to equality is certainly not an
empty vessel. If people or couples should be treated alike, the right to
equality requires that they must be treated alike.
Again, the Founders recognized that "all men are created
equal."35 The implications of that powerful phrase are among the most
controversial in all of political philosophy. In ways similar to Berlin's
discussion of positive and negative liberty we can distinguish two
senses of equality in western political theory. Positive equality tends
to emphasize a more equitable allocation of wealth and resources.
Many liberals have advocated wholesale redistribution on normative
and theoretical grounds,36 all the while realizing that contemporary
political culture makes all but the most modest wealth reallocation im-
possible.37 Negative equality, equality of opportunity, is a social value,
however, to which liberals, communitarians, and conservatives share a
common commitment. Whether it is a prestigious and high paying job,
or the opportunity to social and legal recognition of a lasting romantic
partnership, it would seem that the argumentative burden would al-
ways be on those who deny that different people should have an equal
chance at the desired situation.
33. Peter Westen, "The Empty Idea of Equalit"y, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537, 537-96 (1982).
Harvard Law Review Reprinted in Schauer and Sinnott-Armstrong, op. cit., p. 500.
34. See Supra note 32.
35. See Supra note 1.
36. See RAwLS, supra note 7 and RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE (Harvard Univ.
Press, 2002).
37. See THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY (Oxford Univ. Press, 1995).
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VI.
To alter a social institution by altering the shared public meanings
that constitute it (whether by use of the law or otherwise) is to al-
ter-if not immediately then certainly soon-the individual
identity, perceptions, aspirations, and conduct formed by reference
to the old institution. The greater the alteration to the institution,
the greater the changes in the individual. Likewise, the more influ-
ential the social institution being changed, the greater the changes
in the individual.
38
A detailed analysis of the various arguments against homosex-
ual marriage will not be proffered in the present discussion.
Nevertheless, it is appropriate to state some guidelines to which those
arguments may reasonably expected to adhere. It seems that there are
three general complaints against the proposal that gay and lesbian
couples should have the right to marriage. One is religious, the next is
sociological, and the last complaint which is much more difficult to
characterize, ultimately entails the notion of public offense. The relig-
ious and public offense complaints violate widely shared political
values while the sociological, simply relies on bad social science.
Whether or not it is believed that the Establishment Clause de-
mands a strict separation of church and state, the importance of some
distinction between religious creed and secular public policy is recog-
nized. Many sincerely believe that homosexuality, in general, and its
legal sanction in marriage, violate fundamental theological principles.
Inevitably, these folks will establish their church practices in accor-
dance with these principles. Marriage in this culture, however, is only
partly a religious institution. Specific faiths and denominations ad-
here to strict criteria regarding who may, or may not, marry within
their churches, synagogues, mosques, etc. However, secular marriage,
or marriage within more inclusive religious institutions, should never
be dictated by the demands of specific religious views. To surrender to
the religious view against gay and lesbian marriage is to abandon the
value of religious freedom that the critics of homosexual marriage,
themselves, relish in.
Cultures and institutions within cultures change over time. It
is not necessary to be a professional historian or sociologist to acknowl-
edge that obvious fact of the human condition. Abrupt changes in
society can result in quite dramatic, and sometimes disruptive,
changes in cultural institutions. Think of the effects of World War II
38. Stewart, Neil, & Duncan, Marriage and the Betrayal of Perez and Loving, BYU L.
REV. 3, 555, 555-595 (2005).
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and the entry of women into the labor force, or the cultural changes
engendered by the civil rights and women's movements. As these very
examples show, given just a little historical distance, these sudden
changes in our institutions may be judged as overwhelmingly positive.
Perhaps the most often voiced criticism of homosexual marriage
is that such cultural and legal changes will destroy the institution of
marriage. If those words are intended as anything more than a slogan,
they amount to an empirical prediction about the institution of mar-
riage after such a change. Exactly what is being claimed here is
unclear. Are Critics predicting that fewer heterosexual couples will
choose to enter into relationships, that there will be more divorces, or
that existing marriages will mean less to the partners? These social
hypotheses are not only unsupported by any sort of social scientific re-
search, but are intrinsically dubious. Indeed, proponents of the right
to homosexual marriage might well turn the tables and predict that
the protracted social battles that would result in cultural and legal
change would actually strengthen the institution of marriage. After
all, gay and lesbian citizens committed to marriage are willing to ex-
pend great deal of time, effort, and money to be allowed to marry.
Instead of simply taking the institution for granted, in this period
where many, irrespective of their politics or sexual orientation, must
rethink the purpose and value of marriage.
The final argument against gay marriage is much more difficult
to accurately describe. On the other hand, characterizations that beg
the question are quite easy to come by. Many who defend the right of
gay and lesbian couples to marry are tempted to characterize the other
side as simply homophobic. It is worth mentioning that advocates for
racial or gender exclusion are characterized as racists and sexists, thus
focusing on attitudes of prejudice, but advocates for exclusion on the
grounds of sexual preference characterized as phobic, implicating emo-
tions that seem far more removed from the tempering of reason and
fairness.
To find someone a little more rational in the widespread opposi-
tion to homosexual marriage, Justice Scalia provides a good candidate.
The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its citi-
zens that certain forms of sexual behavior are "immoral and
unacceptable," . . . the same interest furthered by criminal laws
against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and
obscenity.
39
39. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599, (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Many people do seem to believe that homosexuality, and particularly,
homosexual marriage, are so immoral and unacceptable that demo-
cratic majorities have the right to use the power of law to discourage
the behavior. Already conceded to the legal moralist the legitimacy of
laws prohibiting corpse desecration, or animal abuse, on the grounds
that almost everyone finds the behavior immoral and unacceptable.
Why isn't that sort of simple appeal to public morality open to the critic
of homosexual marriage?
Lord Devlin clearly saw that discovering public morality was
more complicated than simply counting votes.
How is the law-maker to ascertain the moral judgments of society?
It is surely not enough that they should be reached by the opinion of
the majority; it would be too much to require the individual assent
of every citizen.4
0
It is absurd to require unanimity to determine a level of outrage and
offense that would justify legislating public morality. Surely it is
equally absurd to suggest that if 53% are morally offended, and only
47% are not, then the state is authorized to use its police power to fur-
ther the moral interests of the majority. Devlin actually proposed a
much more subtle test for the legitimacy of morally inspired
legislation.
English law has evolved and regularly uses a standard which does
not depend on the counting of heads. It is that of the reasonable
man. ... It is the viewpoint of the man in the street. ... I should
like to call him the man in the jury box, for the moral judgment of
society must be something about which any twelve men or women
drawn at random might after discussion be expected to be
unanimous.
4 1
Hart saw over fifty years ago that many of the things Devlin seemed so
concerned about, such as male homosexuality, adultery, and the like,
would very likely fail the man in the jury box test.42 Homosexual mar-
riage would likely also fail it now. Surely it can be expected that some
jury members would be opposed to gay marriage, but hardly
unanimity.
VII.
The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a con-
trary necessity marks its outer limit. With Cardozo, we recognize
40. See supra note 12.
41. Id.
42. See supra note 13.
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that no judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each issue
afresh in every case that raised it .... Indeed, the very concept of
the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such con-
tinuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition,
indispensable.... At the other extreme, a different necessity would
make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so
clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason
doomed.... The sum of the precedential enquiry to this point shows
Roe's underpinnings unweakened in any way affecting its central
holding. While it has engendered disapproval, it has not been un-
workable. An entire generation has come of age free to assume Roe's
concept of liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in society,
and to make reproductive decisions; no erosion of principle going to
liberty or personal autonomy has left Roe's central holding a doctri-
nal remnant.43
Earlier passages mention quotes from some of the significant
cases in our constitutional history. The preceding argument has
stressed consistent patterns in American political philosophy. Cer-
tainly the great minds on our Supreme Court have as much claim to
our attention with regard to these theoretical considerations as any
law professor or political theorist. At this stage, however, explicitly
shifts focus and prosecutes the outlines of a legal and constitutional
argument. Unfortunately, there is a very serious problem, since per-
haps the central case in this doctrinal argument is one that explicitly
overturned recent constitutional precedent.
44
Justice Kennedy explicitly addresses all of this in his startlingly
candid majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas.
45
The rationale of Bowers does not withstand careful analysis. In his
dissenting opinion in Bowers JUSTICE STEVENS came to these
conclusions:
"Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the
fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed
a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for up-
holding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition
could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional at-
tack. Second, individual decisions by married persons, concerning
the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not in-
tended to produce offspring, are a form of 'liberty' protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this
protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as mar-
ried persons."
43. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).
44. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
45. Id.
PRIVACY, AUTHENTICITY & EQUALITY
JUSTICE STEVENS' analysis, in our view, should have been con-
trolling in Bowers and should control here. Bowers was not correct
when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to re-
main binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is
overruled.
4 6
Justice Kennedy finds himself in a potentially embarrassing situation.
It is not just that he is overruling a very recent constitutional prece-
dent, a case in which some of his current colleagues had ruled for a
very different outcome, but that he himself had made appeal to the
need for respecting precedent as part of tri-authored majority opinion
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.47
Kennedy is at pains to distinguish the need to honor precedent
in Casey48 and overturn precedent in Lawrence49. What is intriguing is
that the argument presented is not the simplistic one that Roe v. Wade
was good constitutional law, and that Bowers v. Hardwick was bad.
His strategy is to focus on those who would be directly affected by the
dramatic change - the state and the individuals - by overturning rela-
tively recent precedent.
The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the respect accorded to
the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law. It is not,
however, an inexorable command.... In Casey we noted that when
a court is asked to overrule a precedent recognizing a constitutional
liberty interest, individual or societal reliance on the existence of
that liberty cautions with particular strength against reversing
course.... The holding in Bowers, however, has not induced detri-
mental reliance comparable to some instances where recognized
individual rights are involved. Indeed, there has been no individual
or societal reliance on Bowers of the sort that could counsel against
overturning its holding once there are compelling reasons to do so.
Bowers itself causes uncertainty, for the precedents before and after
its issuance contradict its central holding.
50
It is safe to assume that neither individuals, nor the state, had come to
rely on the continued existence of sodomy statutes in anything like the
way women had come to rely on abortion rights.
There are three very different reasons for this in the discussion.
One is its intrinsic interest. Actually, there is a new consideration of
principle that purports to demarcate very different thresholds that
cases must meet if principles of stare decisis are to be controlling. This
46. Id. at 579.
47. Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
48. Id.
49. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
50. Lawrence at 578.
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test is intriguing, and initially plausible. The second reason is Justice
Kennedy himself. Although this essay is not intended as a work of po-
litical jurisprudence, and offers no concrete predictions about where
the Court may be headed on the issue of homosexual marriage, it's
hard to ignore the central role that Justice Kennedy plays in the cur-
rent Court. Questions about honoring or overruling Equal Protection
and Due Process precedent will clearly play some role, if the Court ever
agrees to review a case challenging the denial of marriage rights to gay
and lesbian couples. Kennedy, if nothing else, has shown himself to be
a subtle and unpredictable thinker on these issues.
The last reason for muddying these jurisprudential waters is a
confession of worry. Imagine defenders of exclusive heterosexual mar-
riage rights using Kennedy's societal reliance test to their own
benefit.5 1 Although it is absurd to suggest that society had come to
rely on the criminalization of either homosexual or heterosexual sod-
omy, it is not nearly as silly to consider the possibility that it had come
to rely on marriage being legally defined in very conventional terms.
Initial reaction to such an argumentative strategy is to take philosoph-
ical refuge in the literature on group rights. It is difficult to make
sense of a strong moral or constitutional right when the alleged recipi-
ent of that right is a collective or group. It's pretty clear what is being
asserted when a woman has come to rely on her right to secure an
abortion, but far less clear when the state argues that it has come to
rely on its right to prohibit her from marrying someone of the same
sex. Expectation has a quite literal meaning when there is talk of con-
scious individuals, but is at best a suggestive metaphor when there is
talk of groups or states.
VIII.
The question before us is whether, consistent with the Massachu-
setts Constitution, the Commonwealth may deny the protections,
benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individ-
uals of the same sex who wish to marry. We conclude that it may
not. The Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and equal-
ity of all individuals. It forbids the creation of second-class citizens.
In reaching our conclusion we have given full deference to the argu-
ments made by the Commonwealth. But it has failed to identify
any constitutionally adequate reason for denying civil marriage to
same-sex couples.5
2
51. Supra note 48.
52. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 312 (2003).
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The candor and economy of the Chief Justice of the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court's reasoning above is striking. The
Massachusetts Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all indi-
viduals. Denying gays and lesbians the right to civil marriage treats
them unequally. They become second-class citizens, which certainly
constitutes a gross indignity. Therefore, the State's ban on same-sex
marriage is unconstitutional. There is agreement in every premise of
Marshall's argument, but what is troubling is the immediate leap to
the conclusion of unconstitutionality. The problem is that the argu-
ment contains a huge constitutional enthymeme.
Equal Protection jurisprudence has long confronted the follow-
ing problem. Virtually every law or regulation manages to treat some
citizens differently than others. Speed limits create a hardship for lead
foots, but cause no inconvenience to timid drivers at all. Tax laws may
advantage or disadvantage the wealthy or poor, the married or single.
Certainly the Equal Protection Clause was never intended to preclude
the state's authority to pass laws governing its highways or tax poli-
cies. This means that only some laws will run afoul of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and some test or formula for deciding which laws trans-
gress Equal Protection should be operative, and ideally, clearly
articulated.
Our Supreme Court has quite wisely seen the dangers of having
every bit of controversial legislation be open to the charge of inequal-
ity. The Court would do nothing but deal with Equal Protection cases.
The judiciary's decision to let the legislative and executive branches
decide the wisdom and necessity of most laws and policies, regardless
of the fact that they manifestly treat their citizens differently makes
practical and theoretical sense.
All of this, of course, was clearly seen by the dissenters in the Good-
ridge case.In applying the rational basis test to any challenged
statutory scheme, the issue is not whether the Legislature's ratio-
nale behind that scheme is persuasive to us, but only whether it
satisfies a minimal threshold of rationality.53
The rational basis test is often a bitter pill to swallow. A law may be
examined and reach a reasonable conclusion that it is quite irrational.
Sometimes that judgment will simply be based on the Court's assess-
ment of the policy implications, the inherent difficulty in enforcement,
the cost of implementation, that it is counter-productive to its stated
purpose, and a host of other possible complaints. Other times suspi-
cions run deep of the legislature favoring a particular religious group,
53. Id. at 357 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
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or making a controversial moral judgment, or in the pocket of unscru-
pulous lobbyists. None of this is constitutionally relevant, however, if
courts are going to defer to the other branches for judgments about the
public's interest.
No one should infer that the Equal Protection Clause is an
empty vessel. The Court recognizes that there are areas of social life
where long standing attitudes of prejudice and intolerance have found
their way into law and public policy. Laws implicating race, religious
belief, and gender are clear examples where individuals find them-
selves being treated differently. The rational basis test for inequality
would not only be unhelpful, but downright antithetical for purposes of
the Equal Protection Clause. There is a powerful case that homosexu-
als should be treated as a protected class under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The analogies between women, and racial and religious
minorities are obvious. Gays and lesbians find themselves the victims
of abhorrence and discrimination on the basis of a characteristic that
was quite beyond their control. This holds true no matter where a per-
son stands on the social or biological origins of sexual orientation.
Unfortunately, the notion of a protected class is as much a product of
constitutional history as it is one of theoretical defining conditions.
Barring some remarkably courageous constitutional breakthrough,
homosexuals do not constitute a protected class under the Fourteenth
Amendment because courts heretofore have not considered them so.
Far more promising to the cause of homosexual marriage, how-
ever, is a second constitutional ground for abandoning the rational
basis test for a denial of Equal Protection, and substituting the much
more exacting test of strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court has shown
great impatience with laws that disadvantage certain groups of people,
regardless of their "protected" or "non-protected" status, with respect
to certain "fundamental" constitutional rights.54 Socio-economic class
is not protected under the Equal Protection Clause, and anyone can
easily see that people are treated quite unequally because of their pov-
erty or wealth. Such inequalities will be seen by our Court, not as
violations of the Equal Protection Clause, but as natural, maybe even
desirable, consequences of free-market capitalism. When poverty,
however, gets in the way of an individual's constitutional right to vote
or have a fair trial, the Court will insist that the state show why it has
a "compelling interest" in having a poll tax, or denying legal defense at
the public expense. 55 It's hardly surprising, therefore, that much of the
54. See supra note 50.
55. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) and Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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jurisprudential discussion of same-sex marriage has focused on
whether marriage is constitutionally a fundamental right.
Ix.
Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to
our very existence and survival.... To deny this fundamental free-
dom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications
embodied in these statutes, classifications . . . [is] directly subver-
sive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth
Amendment.. 56
For many of my students it was almost incomprehensible that it
took until 1967 for the Supreme Court to invalidate such an obviously
racist piece of legislation as the Virginia Racial Integrity Act of 1924,
which reads in part:
It shall hereafter be unlawful for any white person in this State to
marry any save a white person, or a person with no other admix-
ture of blood than white and American Indian. For the purpose of
this act, the term "white person" shall apply only to the person who
has no trace whatsoever of any blood other than Caucasian; but
persons who have one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American
Indian and have no other non-Caucasic blood shall be deemed to be
white persons. All laws heretofore passed and now in effect regard-
ing the intermarriage of white and colored persons shall apply to
marriages prohibited by this act. 57
Long overdue by the middle 1960s the constitutional issue was a no-
brainer, as indicated by the Court's unanimous decision. 58 The fact
that the issues so perfectly fit into existing Equal Protection parame-
ters potentially hides its significance for homosexual marriage.
If anything in contemporary constitutional law is clear, it is
that race is a protected class and triggers strict scrutiny. Mildred Lov-
ing was black, and Richard Loving was white. Their marriage was
illegal simply because of their races. Of course the state was doomed
in its argument for a rational basis for the law. Everyone knew it was
a relic of slavery and the Civil War, coupled with the eugenics craze of
the 1920s. The denial of Equal Protection is so blatant that there was
a temptation to focus exclusively on issues of race.
There can be no question but that Virginia's miscegenation statutes
rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race. The statutes
56. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
57. Racial Integrity Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-58 and 20-59 (1924) (overruled, Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
58. Loving, 388 U.S., at 11.
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proscribe generally accepted conduct if engaged in by members of
different races. Over the years, this Court has consistently repudi-
ated "[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their
ancestry" as being "odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality."59
And as odious as the racial issues were, and as much of a triumph for
civil rights as the case was, Loving v. Virginia60 was also about two
other significant constitutional issues.
Almost as obvious as the issue of race was, the case was also
about marriage. Quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma61 marriage is reaf-
firmed as one of the "basic civil rights of man." Both in Skinner62 and
Loving63 are more than rhetorical flourish. The Court was clearly say-
ing that marriage is a fundamental right under the Constitution. If
this is correct, it has tremendous significance in potential Equal Pro-
tection litigation. The fluid and controversial issue of whether sexual
orientation constitutes a protected class need not be resolved. Strict
scrutiny will be required in homosexual marriage cases, not because of
the protected or non-protected status of the litigants, but because of
the fundamentality of the right they are claiming they were unequally
denied. As this whole essay has been arguing, when the burden is
placed on the state to show that the laws forbidding homosexual mar-
riage are required to have a "compelling governmental interest," they
will surely fail.64
Less obvious, but equally valuable is the fact that Loving v. Vir-
ginia65 was also a privacy case. Here is the full quote that was
excerpted in the quote that began this section.
These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without
due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom to marry has long been rec-
ognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.
Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamen-
tal to our very existence and survival. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942). See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as
the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications
so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the
59. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
60. Id.
61. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
62. Id.
63. Loving, 388 U.S. 1.
64. Supra note 50.
65. Loving, 388 U.S. 1.
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Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens
of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment
requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by
invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the free-
dom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with
the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.
Thus, the state not only violates Equal Protection rights of interracial
couples, or gay and lesbian couples, it violates privacy rights of the
individuals that make up these couples. Again, recall the words of Jus-
tice Brennan in Eisenstadt.
6 6
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered
in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an inde-
pendent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association
of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
6 7
The state may not intrude into issues fundamentally affecting a
person. Decisions about bearing or begetting a child fall into this cate-
gory. Decisions about medical care and euthanasia 68 fundamentally
affect a person. After Lawrence v. Texas,69 so do decisions about pri-
vate, consenting, adult sexual behavior. 70 Marriage is a "basic civil
right of man," and a fundamental right under the Constitution. The
decision to marry surely counts as one of the handful of decisions that
"fundamentally affects a person."
X.
When my late husband, Richard, and I got married in
Washington, DC in 1958, it wasn't to make a political statement or
start a fight. We were in love, and we wanted to be married.
We didn't get married in Washington because we wanted to
marry there. We did it there because the government wouldn't al-
low us to marry back home in Virginia where we grew up, where we
met, where we fell in love, and where we wanted to be together and
build our family. You see, I am a woman of color and Richard was
66. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, (1972).
67. Id. at 453.
68. Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261(1990).
69. Loving, supra.
70. See Lawarence, 539 U.S. at 566, quoting (After Griswold it was established that the
right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital
relationship.).
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white, and at that time people believed it was okay to keep us from
marrying because of their ideas of who should marry whom....
Surrounded as I am now by wonderful children and
grandchildren, not a day goes by that I don't think of Richard and
our love, our right to marry, and how much it meant to me to have
that freedom to marry the person precious to me, even if others
thought he was the "wrong kind of person" for me to marry. I be-
lieve all Americans, no matter their race, no matter their sex, no
matter their sexual orientation, should have that same freedom to
marry. Government has no business imposing some people's relig-
ious beliefs over others. Especially if it denies people's civil rights.
I am still not a political person, but I am proud that Rich-
ard's and my name is on a court case that can help reinforce the
love, the commitment, the fairness, and the family that so many
people, black or white, young or old, gay or straight seek in life. I
support the freedom to marry for all. That's what Loving, and Lov-
ing, are all about.
7 1
The lovely words above were penned by Mildred Loving on the
occasion of the fortieth anniversary of Loving v. Virginia.7 2 Perhaps
the ultimate message here is that the words and thoughts of academics
and Supreme Court justices may never match the eloquence and in-
sight of the principles who actually find their lives defined by the laws
and cases scholars analyze and evaluate.
71. http://www.positiveliberty.com/2007/06/mildred-lovings-statement.html
72. Loving, 388 U.S. 1.
